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DEBUNKING THE STANDARDIZED NATURE OF
INSURANCE POLICIES
Elizabeth Sousa*
ABSTRACT
This article discredits the conventional view of insurance policies as
standardized contracts that do not vary across insurance companies
and policyholders. Contrary to this view, there are wide variations in
policy language in both the admitted and non-admitted insurance
markets. These deviations reduce the perceived benefit of insurance
policies as standardized contracts intended to promote predictability
and lower transaction costs for policyholders by focusing only on the
most salient terms. Nowhere is this deviation more apparent than with
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies defendants are turning
to in the current opioid litigation.
The opioid epidemic has been plaguing the United States for the last
several years and, in its wake, many state and local government
entities have sued those involved in the manufacture, sale,
distribution, and prescription of opioid products. Naturally these
defendants have looked to their insurance policies for defense
expenses and coverage, given the exorbitant potential liability they
face. Depending on the specific allegations and complaints, different
insurance policies can apply.
The CGL policy is the primary policy that defendants have turned to.
The principal coverage disputes between policyholders and insurance
companies are whether the complaint alleges “bodily injury,”
“property damage,” or “occurrence.” These terms are defined in an
insurance policy and many CGL policies utilize standardized
language and definitions. Despite the uniformity in language, courts
decisions in multiple jurisdictions have been incredibly inconsistent
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in whether the CGL policy should respond and if insurers have a duty
to defend in these opioid lawsuits. As a result, policyholders lose the
benefit of predictability and lower transaction costs that legal
scholarship has historically assigned to insurance policies as
standardized contracts.
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INTRODUCTION
Insurance is misunderstood and its importance realized too late–
primarily only after a loss occurs. The essential value of insurance lies in
the terms and conditions of the policy. The misunderstanding of insurance
policies comes from the longstanding view that insurance policies are
boilerplate contracts. This Note argues that there is an overgeneralization
in the conventional understanding of insurance policies as standardized
contracts. The majority of legal scholarship in the insurance sector
focuses on the standardized nature of insurance policies as contracts
between the insurer and the insured.1
While there are certain coverage lines that employ Insurance
Services Office (ISO) standardized language, like property and casualty
coverage for commercial buyers or homeowners and auto insurance for
individual buyers, there are several exceptions to this rule.2 Indeed, niche
or specialty lines like marine, aviation, and product liability for life
science companies, while often drafted based on policy forms, are also
written by individual insurance companies with input from broker
partners as well as clients.3 Moreover, even ISO standardized forms
contain variations that prevent them from qualifying as boilerplate
language.4
There are two primary criticisms against the conventional view of
insurance policies as standardized contracts. First, there are variations in
policy language in both admitted and non-admitted insurance policies,
which discredits the view that insurance policies contain standardized
wording.5 Variations in terms and conditions are more apparent in

1. See, e.g., Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language
Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010) (describing the “hyperstandardization” of
insurance policies); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special
Rules of Interpretation? Text versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“The
only part of the standard policy that is generally customized to the consumer-insured is
the Declarations Sheet . . . . [T]here is little, if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized
language of the insurance contract that determines the scope of coverage.”); Susan
Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107,125 (2007) (“[I]n
some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide identical coverage on the same
take-it-or-leave-it basis.”).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Section II.C.
4. See infra Section II.B.
5. See infra Sections II.A, II.C.

676

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

specialty lines, which are typically considered non-admitted placements,
and allow for greater flexibility of manuscripting, the ability to customize
and tailor coverage to meet the unique needs of a policyholder.6 Second,
in instances where standardized or boilerplate language is used, courts are
inconsistent in how they interpret the language, which leads to nonuniform and mixed outcomes.7 This inconsistency among insurers
surrounding the interpretation of policy language can be damaging to both
the insurer and the insured when engaged in complex litigation. This is
best exemplified by the current opioid lawsuits plaguing pharmaceutical
defendants and the corresponding insurance coverage disputes that have
ensued.8
Part I of this Note provides an overview of insurance underwriting
as a sophisticated mechanism of risk transfer that reduces financial
uncertainty for policyholders, while serving an important public policy
role. It then explores how courts interpret policy in coverage disputes in
light of the incomplete and often incomprehensible nature of how
insurance policies are drafted. Part II outlines the conventional view that
insurance policies are contracts of adhesion that are offered on a take-itor-leave-it basis because of the boilerplate language so often used, which
is intended to reduce transaction costs and the need to negotiate among
parties. This Part further argues, however, that the conventional view is
disrupted due to inconsistencies in personal and commercial lines and the
existence of specialty lines, within the non-admitted marketplace.
Part III then debunks the notion that insurance policies are
standardized through the lens of the current opioid litigation facing
pharmaceutical defendants and the ensuing insurance coverage disputes
that have resulted by focusing on commercial general liability (“CGL”)
policies purchased by sophisticated policyholders. In these disputes, the
courts have had to evaluate standard ISO CGL policies to determine
whether a policy has been triggered and if the insurer has a duty to defend
in two main coverage issues: (1) public nuisance claims and (2) whether
an occurrence, as defined in the policy, took place.9 While courts have

6. See generally Kenneth Wollner, A Vote Against Broker-Drafted Manuscript
Policies (in Most Cases), IRMI (Apr. 2003), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expertcommentary/a-vote-against-broker-drafted-manuscript-policies-in-most-cases?msclkid=
daee0f01c16d11eca1aa6400dab5b15f [https://perma.cc/F93V-YWNJ].
7. See infra Part III.
8. Id.
9. See infra Section III.B.
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interpreted standardized provisions in the CGL policies covering virtually
the same allegations, their decisions have varied as to both coverage
issues.10 This creates uncertainty and unpredictability for insurers using
the standardized CGL policy in assessing whether carriers have an
affirmative duty to defend.11 Moreover, the mixed outcomes in judicial
decisions could have greater impacts for policyholders who obtain
product liability coverage not from a CGL policy, but rather a specialized
policy from the non-admitted market.
PART I. WHAT IS INSURANCE?
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW
It is hard to imagine a society and economy without insurance–an
integral backdrop in the personal and commercial life of many. Insurance
is designed to cover life’s unexpected what-if events and is necessary in
certain instances.12 It is a principal tool that enables individuals and
businesses to reduce the financial impact of a risk event occurring, and
simultaneously provides a sense of security.13 Insurance plays an
important role in individuals’ lives; for example, most Americans are
required to purchase health and auto insurance.14 Moreover, insurance is
the cornerstone of any successful company, as it enables organizations to
conduct their business, meet contractual obligations, and obtain financial
security without worrying about the corresponding risk.15

10.
11.
12.

Id.
See infra Section III.C.
See Insurance 101, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/article/insurance-101
[https://perma.cc/2RKR-7UES] (last accessed Apr. 16, 2021).
13. See generally JEFFREY W. STEMPEL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 1-9
(4th ed. 2011).
14. See, e.g., Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies as
Noncontracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique
Financial Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 539-40 (2017) (discussing the important
role insurance has played for both individuals and businesses since the 1750s. For
example, individuals that want to purchase a house via a bank loan must obtain
homeowners insurance, and companies in all states except Texas are required to obtain
workers’ compensation insurance).
15. Id.
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In its most basic form, insurance is a contract between a policyholder
and an insurance company.16 As part of this contract, the insurance
company agrees to assume the policyholder’s risk and, in the event of a
future loss, pay the corresponding costs in exchange for a premium paid
by the policyholder.17 Insurance provides a safety net for policyholders
and is advantageous because it can pay for defense, settlement, and
verdict costs, as well as indemnifying the policyholder or a third party
against any legal repercussions of a loss.18 Today, there are insurance
solutions for a broad array of perils, ranging from traditional homeowners
and auto liability to property and casualty coverage lines for commercial
buyers, to niche coverage offerings such as product liability for life
science companies, as well as emerging coverage lines like cyber
insurance.19 Almost anything is insurable.20
Legal scholars have promulgated various conceptions of insurance.
For example, Kenneth Abraham, a well-known insurance law professor
at the University of Virginia Law School, highlighted four conceptions of
insurance, including as a: (1) contract; (2) public utility/industry; (3)
product; and, (4) surrogate government for regulating policyholder
16. Jay M. Feinman, Contract and Claim in Insurance Law, 25 CONN. INS. L.J. 153,
154 (2018).
17. INS. INFO. INST., supra note 12.
18. See, e.g., Julie Kagan, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance, INVESTOPEDIA
(Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/directors-and-officers-liabilityinsurance.asp [https://perma.cc/NKM5-8SUF] (discussing benefits of Directors &
Officers insurance).
19. See, e.g., Chubb: Everything You Need to Know, INS. BUS. AM., https://www.
insurancebusinessmag.com/us/companies/chubb/67002/ [https://perma.cc/ZF2U-V76T]
(last visited Mar. 26, 2021) (discussing commercial lines of coverage offered by leading
international insurance company Chubb); Life Sciences, MARSH, https://www.
marsh.com/us/industries/life-sciences.html [https://perma.cc/LZB9-WRBR] (last visited
Mar. 26, 2021) (providing an overview of product liability coverage solutions for
pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, medical device, and research organizations);
Insurance Marketplace Realities 2021 – Cyber Risk, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (Nov. 18,
2020), https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/2020/11/insurance-market
place-realities-2021-cyber-risk [https://perma.cc/Q7RT-VV8A] (discussing the increase
in cyber threats in light of the current remote environment and how cyber insurance is a
solution).
20. See Brian Marx, Iconic Lloyd’s of London Insurance Policies, PSA
(Jan. 2, 2013), https://www.psafinancial.com/2013/01/iconic-lloyds-of-london-insurance
-policies/ [https://perma.cc/2MSK-D8JN] (describing unique insurance policies offered
by Lloyd’s of London syndicates to insure Gene Simmons’ tongue, Heidi Klum’s legs,
and even a policy offering a reward for the capture of the Loch Ness Monster).
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behavior.21 Other scholars and experts have emphasized the societal role
that insurance policies play and focused on the underlying public policy
concerns, like compensating injured parties and reducing moral hazard
risks.22 Furthermore, another scholar has argued that insurance policies
should not be treated as contracts because they do not qualify as contracts
under the traditional rules of contract formation.23 Thus, insurance
policies should be interpreted in a manner beyond just contract law.
B. INTERPRETING POLICIES THAT ARE COMPLEX AND LACK CLARITY
Overwhelmingly, insurance policies are complex and lengthy
contracts that are purposely left incomplete. This is true for both personal
and commercial policies (even though the latter is typically purchased by
sophisticated buyers), as it is virtually impossible for the parties to
conceive of all potential scenarios that may give rise to a future claim. 24
Some of the gaps in these contracts will be due to cognitive limitations
since a contract cannot adapt to every contingency, while others will be
strategic considerations, or, most importantly, carved out around
transaction costs (otherwise associated with arguing ambiguities in
court).25 Furthermore, parties may actively choose to draft incomplete
contracts by using vague terms or deliberately failing to include (or
preclude) coverage for every possible event within the base policy form,
as doing so would increase the costs of the contract negotiation.26 Instead,
the courts clarify this incompleteness of the contract when a dispute
arises.27

21. Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653,
657 (2013).
22. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495-1513 (2010); French, supra note 14, at 540.
23. See, e.g., French, supra note 14, at 536-37 (arguing that in the insurance policy
there is no meeting of the minds between the policyholder and insurance company
regarding the terms and conditions, and there is arms-length bargaining).
24. Feinman, supra note 16, at 158.
25. See generally Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical
Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66
MOD. L. REV. 44, 44 (2003).
26. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 816 (2006).
27. Id. at 835.
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The meaning of vague terms in insurance policies are often derived
from common industry understanding and judicial interpretation.28
Without a doubt, insurance companies have an advantage here, especially
over non-sophisticated buyers who may not have working knowledge of
the terms’ meanings.29 Insurers expect to pay exactly what is covered or
“owed” as defined by the terms of the policy as understood by “industry,
regulatory and legal norms.”30 Many non-sophisticated policyholders,
primarily in personal lines, do not read their insurance policies and
therefore do not have a working understanding of what is covered within
their purchased policy.31 Indeed, policies are often not read until after a
loss occurs.32
The possibility that the insurance policy is incomplete means that the
insured and the Insurer could have very different understandings as to
what they believe the purpose of the policy is, and what it is designed to
cover.33 These differences often lead to two particular disputes.34 First,
coverage disputes arise out of disagreements over the interpretation of
policy language, the facts of the claim, or controlling law.35 Second,
disputes arise about one of the parties’ performance obligations under the
claim, such as an insurer’s obligation in processing a claim or a
policyholder’s duty of cooperation.36 Unsurprisingly, in disputes where
coverage is being denied by the Insurer, they point to the language of their
policy form and how it does not fit the circumstances of the claim.37 For
example, insurers will often point to their purposefully vague policy form
language and argue that they have no obligation to cover the claim,
because the policy does not include the specific set of circumstances at
issue in the claim.38

28.
29.
30.
31.

Feinman, supra note 16, at 158.
Id.
Id.
Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95
IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2010).
32. Id. at 1080-81.
33. Feinman, supra note 16, at 61.
34. Id. at 160-61.
35. Id. at 160.
36. Id. at 160-61.
37. Abraham, supra note 21, at 658.
38. Id.

2022]

DEBUNKING THE STANDARDIZED NATURE
OF INSURANCE POLICIES

681

The interpretation of insurance policies is a question of law.39 When
construing insurance policies, courts will review the provisions of the
contract and will apply the ordinary rules of contract interpretation.40 This
involves determining what the parties intended to cover under the policy
based on the language used in the contract.41 Furthermore, any
ambiguities in the policy language, are construed in favor of the insured. 42
However, a court’s holding regarding the ambiguous language is binding
on everyone that has that particular provision in their policy form, not just
the parties involved in that particular lawsuit.43
Additionally, there are two key canons of contract interpretation that
courts typically use in insurance coverage dispute litigations: contra
proferentem and reasonable expectations doctrine.44 “Contra proferentem
requires courts to interpret ambiguous [language] against the drafter.”45
Under the reasonable expectation doctrine, however, courts try to
determine the parties’ intent instead of placing a thumb on the scale for
the non-drafting party.46 Both of these canons favor the insured and help
level the playing field for the less sophisticated party, which makes sense
given the longstanding view that insurance policies are standardized
39. See Sonson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 100 A.3d. 1, 2, 5 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014)
(noting that “standardized contracts of insurance continue to be prime examples of
contracts of adhesion . . .” and that “[t]he interpretation of a contract presents a question
of law subject to de novo review”).
40. San Diego v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583, 589 (Cal. Ct. App.,
2005) (noting that the fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the
mutual intent of the parties, which is inferred by the written language). Further, in
determining the intent of the parties a court must decide whether the language of the
contract is clear or ambiguous. Id.
41. Jang v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 3:15-CV-1243, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
52023, at *7 (D. Conn. Feb. 22, 2018).
42. See Salem Grp. v. Oliver, 607 A.2d 138,139 (N.J. 1992) (“When a policy fairly
supports an interpretation favorable to both the insured and the Insurer, the policy should
be interpreted in favor of the insured.”).
43. Abraham, supra note 21, at 66. See also Christopher C. French, The Butterfly
Effect in Interpreting Insurance Policies, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 48-49 (2019)
(describing the butterfly effect where a court’s interpretation of standardized contract
language, which becomes binding on other users of the same language, results in Insurers
reacting and redrafting their policy language or adding exclusions to avoid that court’s
interpretation of the language).
44. Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39 TORTS &
INS. L.J. 85, 90 (2003).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 90-91.
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contracts of adhesion drafted by the Insurer.47 Further, both canons
contain a public policy preference in favor of requiring coverage for the
insured in order to compensate for the injured party’s unequal bargaining
power.48 However, not all insureds are equal and, therefore, exceptions to
traditional contract interpretation doctrines should be made by the courts
should a dispute arise.
In certain instances, insurance companies have been able to invoke
the sophisticated insured exception in policy interpretation disputes. A
sophisticated insured is generally a large commercial buyer, not an
individual, that tends to have a better understanding of the insurance
world, purchases a significant limit (and therefore pay substantially more
in premiums), and has greater involvement in the negotiation process.49
Additionally, sophisticated insureds often have dedicated risk
management departments and work closely with insurance brokers and
attorneys.50 Because of their understanding of insurance, commercial
buyers are able to canvas the marketplace when seeking insurance
coverage and, consequently, can obtain the best pricing and terms and
conditions available.51 Therefore, the insured in this scenario has a greater
degree of oversight in defining the purchased policy, as well as the terms
and conditions included.52 These buyers are not helpless or uninformed
like the typical individual consumer may be.53 As a result, courts tend to
abandon contra proferentem where sophisticated insureds are involved in
the negotiation process of the policy terms.54

See infra Part II.
Beh, supra note 44.
See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the “Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense
in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV., 807, 833 (1993).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. MetPath, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1087,
1092 (D. Minn. 1999) (observing that under New Jersey law, the sophisticated insured
exception is applicable only where the insurance contract is negotiated, jointly drafted or
drafted by the insured and that Minnesota law is unsettled as to whether the exception is
viable). See generally New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d
1162 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding under Delaware law that the sophisticated insured exception
is inapplicable where the insured did not participate in drafting or negotiation of standard
insurance contract terms).
47.
48.
49.
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PART II. STANDARDIZATION
A. ARE INSURANCE POLICES TRULY STANDARDIZED?
Insurance policies are traditionally viewed as standardized adhesion
contracts or even “super-adhesion” contracts.55 These policies contain
boilerplate language that reduces the need for negotiation, so parties can
focus on the most salient terms: limits, deductibles, and premiums.56
Moreover, standardized insurance policies are intended to reduce
transaction costs for both parties and create contract certainty for
insurance companies, whose goal is to spread risk among numerous
policyholders.57 Since the policies are largely one-sided, the Insurers are
able to avoid negotiation, discussion, or explanation of the terms,
especially since policies are not usually provided until after the coverage
has been purchased.58 Given the take-it-or-leave-it basis that insurance
policies are offered under, policyholders have very little incentive to
review and understand the terms and conditions within the policy form. 59
The standardized nature of insurance policies is largely a result of
the fact that the insurance industry is highly regulated.60 In an effort to
protect the consumer, licensed insurers must receive approval from the
state insurance commissioner as to the terms of a policy before they can
55. See Stempel, supra note 49, at 829; Michelle Boardman, Insuring
Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010)
(describing the “hyperstandardization” of insurance policies).
56. See Stempel, supra note 49, at 816-17; Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76
VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990) (“Property owner’s liability insurance contracts are
standardized across Insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to
bargain around.”). See also Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance
Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1264 n.4 (2011) (“The only part of the standard policy
that is generally customized to the consumer-insured is the Declarations Sheet . . . .
[T]here is little if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized language of the insurance
contract that determines the scope of coverage.”) (citing James M. Fischer, Why are
Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation? Text versus Context, 24
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992)).
57. Stempel, supra note 49, at 829-30.
58. Id. at 816-17.
59. Abraham, supra note 21, at 660.
60. See Jared Wilkerson, Adjudicating Insurance Policy Disputes: A Critique of
Professor Randall’s Proposal to Abandon Contract Law, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
294, 298 (2011) (describing that the insurance industry is primarily regulated at the state
level because of insurance’s importance to the individual policyholder as well as the
public in general).
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sell it.61 Additionally, the insurance companies themselves are regulated
by the state insurance departments. State departments investigate the
financial solvency of insurance companies by reviewing their books and
records, assure the quality of products offered by the companies, and
guarantee fairness in dealings between the big players in the industry and
policyholders.62 These are particularly important regulatory controls,
since the contractual relationship between the parties involved in these
transactions are usually not equal.63
Insurance companies that are licensed to do business in a state are
referred to as “admitted insurers” and are also regulated by the state’s
insurance department.64 This means that the state’s insurance
commissioner must approve the rates and forms the insurance company
is using and providing to policyholders for a premium.65 Additionally,
admitted Insurers have financial support from the state’s guarantee fund,
should they become insolvent.66 Because of this regulatory oversight,
insurance policies are generally standardized contracts that are drafted by
the insurance industry, specifically by the ISO.67 The ISO is an advisory
organization that focuses on property and casualty insurance and provides
actuarial and underwriting support, and other services to member
insurance organizations.68 One important service that ISO provides for
Insurers is policy writing.69
Insurance companies pay a membership fee to belong to the ISO and,
as a result, are able to use policy forms drafted by ISO.70 The organization
61.
62.
63.
64.

Abraham, supra note 21, at 662-63.
See generally 1 BUSINESS INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.02 (2020).
Id.
See Regulation, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/publications/commercialinsurance/how-it-functions/regulation [https://perma.cc/3SEM-RAXX] (last visited Apr.
1, 2021).
65. Id.
66. Richard F. Hull, Using the Excess and Surplus Lines Market, INS. J. (July 2,
2002), https://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/mag-features/2002/07/22/22900.
htm [https://perma.cc/3Y8E-P89K].
67. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV.
203, 206 (2010).
68. See Marianne Bonner, Insurance Services Office (ISO), BALANCE SMALL BUS.,
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/insurance-services-office-iso-462706
[https://perma.cc/R6DV-MFU5] (last updated May 16, 2019).
69. Id.
70. See French, supra note 14, at 547. ISO has over 1,400 property and casualty
Insurers that are members. Id. at 547 n.71.
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drafts the majority of property and general liability policies that are
offered in the market.71 For example, the ISO CGL coverage form is the
industry standard for general liability coverage and is designed to provide
broad protection for certain losses sustained by third parties arising out of
an insured’s business operations.72
The ISO works in tandem with insurance companies to design and
amend policy forms.73 For example, war is a common exclusion found in
insurance policies and has historically been interpreted to only apply to
hostile action between sovereign states, but not to terrorist actions.74
However, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by nonstate actors, there was a public policy push for insurance coverage for
victims of the attacks; consequently, insurance companies realized that
war and terrorism risks were transforming and becoming more
catastrophic than in the past.75 As a result, they worked closely with the
ISO to draft a broad terrorism exclusion that would be included in
standard policies.76 The ISO contends that consumers “benefit from the
clarity that the standard coverage language achieves.”77 However, this
may not necessarily be the case, as courts have arrived at mixed decisions
in lawsuits using ISO-based policy language.78
B. CHALLENGES AGAINST STANDARDIZATION
Although carriers may use ISO-based policy forms, many alter their
policies by drafting their own endorsements that are then attached to the
contract.79 Modifications to the ISO policy form were common during the
71.
72.

Stempel, supra note 67, at 206.
See generally David Goodwin et al., Commercial General Liability (CGL)
Insurance, COVINGTON & BURLINGTON LLP, https://www.lexisnexis.com/supp/Large
Law/no-index/coronavirus/insurance/insurance-commercial-general-liabilityinsurance.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL7V-LSE4] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
73. Stempel, supra note 67, at 206.
74. Id. at 207.
75. Id. at 207-08.
76. Id. at 208.
77. Ins. Servs. Office Inc., ISO: Enhancing Competition in the World’s Insurance
Markets (1999), reprinted in KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION
33 (3d ed. 2000).
78. See discussion infra Part III.
79. See Patrick Wright, You Can’t Just Say “Yes, There’s Coverage”, INS. J. (May
16, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2018/05/16/489
281.htm [https://perma.cc/6W7S-KPDD].
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soft insurance market,80 when the market was saturated with capacity and
competition and carriers needed to find new ways to compete beyond
price.81 Many added insured-specific endorsements to fit the unique
coverage needs of a company, or endorsements that clarified a vague
provision of the base policy form.82 This practice of modification shows
that the conventional view of insurance policies as truly standardized
forms is not entirely accurate.
In recent years, courts and legal scholars have commented on the
discrepancy in policy forms and their deviation from the standard
language.83 In particular, one legal commentator posed that we should
reconsider the idea of insurance as standardized contracts following the
result of his research on homeowners’ policies.84 Daniel Schwarcz
reviewed Homeowners 3 Special Form (“HO3”) policies,85 in six states
from 24 insurance companies.86 His findings highlighted that homeowner
policies are not standardized, neither within nor among the states, as
conventional theory suggests.87
80. See Bethan Moorcraft, What is a Hard Insurance Market?, INS. BUS.
MAG. (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/guides/what-is-a-hard
-insurance-market-180382.aspx [https://perma.cc/9J5K-Q7LU] (describing how the
insurance market is cyclical and fluctuates between a soft and hard market). A soft market
is characterized by aggressive competition, low premium charges, high limit offerings
and flexibility of coverage. Id. See generally Commercial Insurance Buyers Can Expect
Hard Market Conditions to Continue Throughout 2021, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (Nov.
19, 2020), https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-US/News/2020/11/commercialinsurance-buyers-can-expect-hard-market-conditions-to-continue-throughout-2021
[https://perma.cc/4Y27-MK8J] (describing how the insurance market is currently in a
hard market and the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated this already challenging
market, and conditions of high premium rates and reductions in capacity are expected to
continue).
81. See generally Jamie Glanz, Why Policy Language Matters, ASSURANCE (Feb. 4,
2019), https://www.assuranceagency.com/blog-post/why-policy-language-matters [https
://perma.cc/9WTC-J5M3].
82. Id.
83. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1263, 1274-75 n.40 (citing legal scholars who noted discrepancies in policy
language dealing with concurrent causation and criminal-act exclusions).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1281 (describing the HO3 form, which covers a policyholder’s home and
other structures on an all-risk basis, which means that coverage is provided for all perils
unless they are specifically excluded).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1278-1300.
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Typically, HO3 policies include both property and liability coverage
grants, and Schwarcz’s research noted variations in both types of
coverage among Insurer’s forms.88 First, his findings showed that,
concerning the property coverage offered in the HO3 policy, carriers
differed in how they handled concurrent causation,89 affirmative coverage
grants for “all-risk” perils,90 mold and fungi exclusions,91 and pollution
exclusions.92 Second, there were stark contrasts in the policy language for
the liability coverage parts of the HO3 policies including: bodily injury
definitions,93 occurrence definitions,94 and expected or intended injury
88.
89.

Id. at 1280-82.
In most states, about half of the carriers followed the HO3 approach
by opting out of only the default rule [efficient proximate cause
(“EPC”)] for policy exclusions. The remaining insurers generally
decreased coverage by expanding the scope of the EPC opt out, thus
increasing the number of perils that cannot contribute in any way to a
covered loss.

Id. at 1280-81.
90. Id. at 1281-82 n.81 (commenting on how policy forms vary in what they agree
to cover under the affirmative “all-risk” coverage grant).
91. Id. at 1285 (commenting that the standard “HO3 form excludes coverage for
mold or fungus unless it is (i) hidden within the walls, floors, or ceilings and (ii) caused
by an accidental discharge or overflow of water or steam”). Of the policies surveyed by
Schwarcz some policies exclude all mold and fungus property damage and that few
carriers utilize the standard HO3 mold exclusion with a limited carveback offering. Id.
92. Id. at 1287.
93. Id. at 1295-96 (noting that bodily injury is defined in an HO3 standard policy as:
“bodily harm, sickness or disease, including required care, loss of services and death that
results”). Litigation is often focused on whether this standard definition encompasses
mental anguish or psychological injury. Of the polices surveyed, Schwarcz found that
many continue to use the ISO definition, but some do redefine it to specifically exclude
“mental, emotional, or psychological harm that does not itself arise out of physical harm
to one’s body.” Id.
94. Id. at 1297. Only injuries from an occurrence are covered in an HO3 policy,
which is defined as: “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions, which results, during the policy
period, in (a) ‘bodily injury’ or (b) ‘property damage.’” Thus, any condition prior to the
start of the policy period where the injury occurred would be covered according to this
definition. However, of the carriers surveyed, some redefined occurrence to specifically
exclude covering an injury for any condition that began prior to the start of the policy
period.
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exclusions.95 The variations amongst the surveyed policies effectively
challenge the belief that all personal-line policies are uniform. Moreover,
Schwarcz’s research is a particularly interesting finding in light of the
significant scholarship and research focused on the standardized nature of
personal lines policies, such as homeowners insurance.
C. THE NON-ADMITTED MARKET AND SPECIALTY COVERAGE LINES
Not only are there wording variances in the admitted market, but
there is an entire subset of the insurance marketplace that is not based on
standardized policy forms, such as specialty lines.96 Specialty lines cover
unique or unusual risks that would be challenging to underwrite in the
traditional market.97 Common specialty lines include: Marine, Aviation,
Professional Liability, Umbrella/Excess, and Product Liability.98
Typically, policies for these types of coverage are written on a nonadmitted basis,99 and are also referred to as Excess and Surplus lines
(E&S).100 This means that the insurance company is not licensed as an
insurance provider in a state but can still conduct business in the state via
an insurance broker or agent.101 Most importantly, a non-admitted Insurer
is not regulated by a state’s insurance department and subsequently has
more flexibility in drafting forms and policy language, which allows them
95. Id. at 1298 (noting that the standard HO3 policy does not provide coverage for
bodily injury or property damage that was expected or intended, and the exclusion is
broad). Some carriers surveyed included a more restrictive expected or intended injury
exclusion in their HO3 form. Id.
96. See generally Denise Johnson, Understanding the Differences Between Standard
and Excess/Surplus Lines, CLAIMS J. (July 31, 2014), https://www.claimsjournal.com/
news/national/2014/07/31/252642.htm [https://perma.cc/WZ32-HAVR] (last visited
April 18, 2022); Specialty Lines, INS. INFO. INST. https://www.iii.org/publications/
commercial-insurance/what-it-does/lines-of-business/specialty-lines [https://perma.cc/
7KL2-GWU2] (last visited Apr. 18, 2022).
97. See Specialty Lines v Standard Lines, SPECIALTY INS. BLOG (Apr. 15, 2005,
4:31 AM), https://specialtyinsurance.typepad.com/specialty_insurance_blog/2005/04/
specialty_lines.html [https://perma.cc/QQF6-75WD].
98. Id. See also What Is Specialty Insurance and Why Is It Important?, MCMAHON
AGENCY (Apr. 2, 2020), https://mcmahonagency.com/what-is-specialty-insurance-andwhy-is-it-important/ [https://perma.cc/3HDV-6LUM].
99. Worldwide Facilities, supra note 97.
100. See What is E&S Insurance?, NATIONWIDE, https://nationwideexcessand
surplus.com/public/about-us/what-is-es-insurance.jsp
[https://perma.cc/QE8A-6E4Z]
(last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
101. Id.
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to be more responsive to the market and clients’ needs.102 The E&S
market is unequivocally an essential segment of the insurance industry.
A principal benefit of having non-admitted coverage is the ability to
manuscript.103 Non-admitted policy forms can be created by brokers for
corporate policyholders104 or can be solely drafted by the Insurer.105 While
some scholarship suggests that the policyholder has no role in drafting the
manuscripted terms,106 that is not actually the case.107 In practice,
corporate policyholders, especially those that are Fortune 500 companies,
are directly involved in the placement of their insurance programs. Many
Fortune 500 companies have well-established risk management
departments that work in tandem with in-house and outside counsel, and
partner with an insurance brokerage service team that specialized in a
particular area of coverage.108 Through this coordinated effort, the
Fortune 500 company has the opportunity to actively draft and manuscript
proposed policy wording or review its policy forms and insurance
program structures, and many take advantage of this.109 Manuscripting
102. See generally Richard F. Hull, Using the Excess and Surplus Lines Market, INS.
J. (July 2, 2002), https://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/mag-features/2002/07/
22/22900.htm [https://perma.cc/RM7G-KKXL].
103. See Excess and Surplus Insurance | E&S Insurance, ZURICH, https://www.
zurichna.com/insurance/excess [https://perma.cc/68PE-S9QP] (last visited Apr. 16,
2022).
104. See, e.g., Global Rail Liability Insurance Facility, MARSH, https://
www.marsh.com/uk/industries/transportation/products/global-rail-liability-insurancefacility.html [https://perma.cc/53X8-UTFF] (last viewed Feb. 4, 2022) (describing a
leading commercial insurance broker’s manuscript property policy (“Marsh Global Rail
Form”), for the unique exposure that railway organizations present); Rodd Zolkos,
‘Wilprop’ Case Changes the Industry, BUS. INS. (Sept. 11, 2011), https://www.
businessinsurance.com/article/00010101/NEWS06/309119984/Wilprop-case-changesthe-industry [https://perma.cc/VHV9-YTBB] (describing the ‘Wilprop’ property policy
that was created by leading broker Willis and how it had a much broader definition of
“occurrence” compared to standard property policies).
105. See French, supra note 14, at 547.
106. Id.
107. See Marsh Broker Leigh Ann Rodgers Recognized as a 2020 Hospitality
Broker, RISK & INS., https://riskandinsurance.com/award-profile/marsh-broker-leigh-ann
-rodgers-recognized-as-a-2020-hospitality-power-broker/ [https://perma.cc/S3Y6-3QG
V] (last visited Apr. 2, 2021) (suggesting client involvement or, at least, awareness in the
manuscriptal policy form that the broker had prepared on their behalf to obtain favorable
coverage).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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coverage involves greater involvement of the policyholder and/or the
broker; however, such involvement puts the policyholder at risk of having
the sophisticated policyholder exception apply against them, should there
be a coverage dispute.110 This could result in a court precluding the
coverage, and the policyholder losing the protections a standard insured
would receive.111
Corporate policyholders do play a role in coverage negotiation and
are likely more aware of what risks are and are not covered in their policy
form compared to individuals or small businesses. Plus, they likely better
understand the terminology used within the form. They have a greater
degree of expertise, resources, and sophistication that they leverage
towards their insurance programs. Therefore, there are not only variances
among Insurers in policy wording for certain lines of coverage in the nonadmitted market, but there are also further variances in language within
one coverage line for an array of policyholders because of the ability to
manuscript coverage.
PART III. THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC LAWSUITS
Thus far, it has been established that there are policy variations
among the admitted and non-admitted markets, which cut against the
common perception of standardization. An additional cut against the
conventional view is the inconsistency in courts’ interpretations of
standard policy language. Nowhere is this more apparent than in current
coverage litigation surrounding the opioid epidemic.
A. THE EPIDEMIC
The opioid epidemic (the “Epidemic”) is a serious health crises
afflicting the United States.112 The perpetrators of the Epidemic are a
110. See infra Part II; New Castle Cnty. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d
1162, 1182 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding under Delaware law that the sophisticated insured
exception is inapplicable where the insured did not participate in drafting or negotiating
the standard insurance contract terms); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. MetPath, Inc.,
38 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1092 (D. Minn. 1999) (noting that the sophisticated insured
exception under New Jersey law only applies where the “insurance contract is negotiated,
jointly drafted or drafted by the insured”).
111. See supra Part I.
112. See What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., https
://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/9JFB-R2M9]
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diverse group of actors ranging from multi-million-dollar pharmaceutical
companies to small town physicians.113 As a result, lawsuits are piling up
against pharmaceutical manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies, as
they face allegations that they are to blame for the alarming increase of
opioid addiction and overdose in the United States.114 There are four main
categories of the opioid litigation: (1) civil lawsuits by governments (city
and county) and tribal sovereign nations against pharmaceutical
manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, retailers;115 (2) civil lawsuits by
state attorneys general against pharmaceutical defendants;116 (3) civil
bankruptcy cases against opioid manufacturers;117 and (4) criminal
prosecutions against pharmaceutical defendants.118

(last visited Feb. 19, 2021) (stating that 70,630 people died from drug overdose in 2019
and 10.1 million people misused prescription opioids in 2019).
113. Katy Baum, Opioid Epidemic Trends and Insights: Law Enforcers are
Expanding and Transforming Their Toolbelts to Hold Anyone and Everyone Accountable
for this National Emergency, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.american
bar.org/groups/health_law/publications/aba_health_esource/2019-2020/march-2020/
oipioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/9ZK9-4XUH].
114. See Dana A. Elfin, Insurers Seek to Avoid Being Drawn Into Opioid Litigation,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-andbusiness/insurers-seek-to-avoid-being-drawn-into-opioid-litigation
[https://perma.cc/H4U2-3PAK].
115. See generally Sara Randazzo, In the Opioid Litigation, It’s States vs. Cities,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-the-opioid-litigation-itsnow-states-v-cities-11565123075 [https://perma.cc/42FZ-9LPL].
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Mike Spector, Purdue Pharma’s Sacklers Increase Opioid Settlement
to $4.3B, INS. J. (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/
2021/03/12/605038.htm [https://perma.cc/2ZSQ-KEAA] (describing the $10 billion
settlement proposal that Purdue submitted to bankruptcy court and members of the
Sacklers family who own Purdue Pharma, agreed to put up $4.275 billion towards the
settlement); Shelia Kaplan & Jan Hoffman, Mallinckrodt Reaches $1.6 Billion Deal to
Settle Opioid Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/02/25/health/mallinckrodt-opioid-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/G3RK-5PJD]
(describing the former largest generic opioid manufacturer Mallinckrodt’s settlement
offer to the bankruptcy court of $1.6 Billion to resolve claims by 47 state attorneys
general).
118. Baum, supra note 113 (noting that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
is pursuing aggressive criminal actions against drug distributors, individual providers and
pharmacies). Specifically the DEA has targeted Rochester Drug Co-Operative and its
executives, for unlawful distribution of controlled substances and conspiracy to defraud
the DEA. Id. The DEA has also targeted providers and pharmacies for participating in
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Many of the lawsuits have been consolidated into an extremely large
and complex multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio, with Judge Daniel Polster at the helm.119
Judge Polster’s strategy in the MDL is to conduct bellwether trials in
order to encourage settlement.120 Moreover, in addition to Judge Polster’s
MDL strategy, his overall goal is to reach a global settlement for the
opioid litigation.121
To date two bellwether trials have occurred. The first took place in
2019, resulting in a $355 million dollar pre-trial settlement with only most
of the defendants, and left Johnson & Johnson (J&J) as the sole defendant
proceeding to trial.122 In 2019, the Oklahoma court ordered J&J to pay
“pill mill” schemes which involve dispensing an absorbingly high amount of prescription
drugs, generally for cash. Id.
119. See Michelle Llamas, Opioid Lawsuits, DRUGWATCH, https://www.drugwatch.
com/opioids/lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/6KU9-5YUC] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021)
(noting that as of August 17, 2020, 2,872 lawsuits were pending in the MDL). But see
Lorelie S. Masters, Michael S. Levine & Michelle M. Spaz, Insurance Coverage for
Claims Stemming From the National Opioid Crisis, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH
(Jan. 25, 2020), https://www.huntoninsurancerecoveryblog.com/2020/02/articles/d-ando/insurance-coverage-for-claims-stemming-from-the-national-opioid-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/5Z35-Q3T4] (describing how the number of opioid related cases in the
MDL 2017 was 200). See generally In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, No.
1:17-MD-2804 (N.D. Ohio 2017), https://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/mdl-2804 [https://
perma.cc/A7XH-F6G4].
120. See generally Stephen M. Copehnhaver, Why Bellwethers Matter in the Opioid
MDL, ARENTFOX SCHIFF (June 10, 2019), https://www.afslaw.com/perspectives/
news/why-bellwethers-matter-in-the-opioid-mdl [https://perma.cc/W96A-4DDZ] (last
visited Apr. 16, 2022); Jeff Overley, Opioid MDL Judge Polster Plots New Bellwether
Trials Across the US, LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1221570/opioid-mdl-judge-plots-new-bellwether-trials-across-us [https://perma.
cc/23DW-4SCD].
121. The global settlement is intended to end all of the opioid litigation by all three
types of government plaintiffs (state, local, tribal sovereignty) against all three types of
opioid defendants (manufacturers, distributors, and retailers). The global settlement for
opioids is thought to be similar to the big tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
of 1998 which totaled more than $200 billion following litigation through the 1990s over
surrounding smoking-related deaths. See Opioid Litigation: Insurance and Risk
Management Considerations, MARSH LLC (May 2018), https://www.marsh.com/us
/insights/research/opioid-litigation-insurance-and-risk-management-considerations.html
[https://perma.cc/XS47-PC37].
122. See Jan Hoffman, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in Landmark
Opioid Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/
health/oklahoma-opioids-johnson-and-johnson.html
[https://perma.cc/2F4Q-5NQ6]
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$572 million in damages.123 The second bellwether trial is currently
underway in Federal Court in Cleveland, Ohio, and involves four national
pharmacy chains and their alleged roles in fueling the epidemic.124 These
are just two examples of cases in a massive web of litigation and they pale
in comparison to the global settlement value, which is currently estimated
to be $50 billion.125
The availability of insurance coverage is critical in the current opioid
lawsuits facing pharmaceutical companies126 because of the alarming

(commenting that in pre-trial settlements, Purdue Pharma and Teva Pharmaceuticals
agreed to pay $270 million and $85 million respectively whereas Johnson & Johnson
decided to proceed to trial). The Oklahoma court ruled that Johnson & Johnson had
created a public nuisance by exaggerating the benefits of opioid products and minimizing
their addiction risks. Id. Oklahoma initially sought J&J to fund a $17 billion “Abatement
Plan” that would provide a remedy for the impacts of the opioid crisis in Oklahoma. Id.
In 2019 the Oklahoma court ordered J&J to pay $572 million in damages and J&J is
currently appealing this judgment to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Jan Hoffman, CVS, Walgreens and Walmart Fueled Opioid Crisis, Jury
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/23/health/
walmart-cvs-opioid-lawsuit-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/4Z8P-N5PU] (informing that
the federal jury in this bellwether case found that CVS Health, Walgreens, and Walmart
substantially contributed to the opioid epidemic). Hearings are expected to begin in the
spring of 2022 to determine the amount in damages each pharmacy owes. Id.
125. See Jan Hoffman, Drug Giants Close in on a $50 Billion Settlement of Opioid
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/16/health/
opioids-settlement-distributors.html [https://perma.cc/ZN7F-QYCX]; Jeff Feely,
Cardinal Health, AmerisourceBergen See $13 Billion Opioid Deal, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-05/cardinal-healthamerisourcebergen-see-13-billion-opioid-deal [https://perma.cc/MMD4-3NG6]; Nate
Raymond, J&J to Pay $5 Billion in Potential Opioid Settlement with States, INS. J. (Oct.
14, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2020/10/14/586398.htm
[https://perma.cc/EP9J-KY72]; Charley Grant, Teva’s Benign Opioid Settlement Isn’t in
the Bag Yet, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tevas-benignopioid-settlement-isnt-in-the-bag-yet-11595772000
[https://perma.cc/43ZJ-PXXV]
(describing that the settlement figure to date involves the three largest drug distributors
Amerisource Bergen, Cardinal Health and McKesson, who are on the hook for $21
billion, and two pharmaceutical manufacturers, Johnson & Johnson who is on the hook
for $5 Billion and Teva who is on the hook for $23 billion). Surprisingly, Teva’s
settlement contribution is primarily comprised of the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s
offer to supply $23 billion dollars’ worth of their buprenorphine naloxone or antiaddiction tablets. Id.
126. Elfin, supra note 114 (quoting Barry Buchman, an attorney at Haynes & Boone:
“[T]he amount of coverage will affect when and whether and for how much these kinds
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defense costs and expected settlement values.127 Furthermore, affirmative
insurance coverage will likely impact the settlement value.128 There are
three types of insurance coverages that are relevant for opioid lawsuits:
CGL (including Product Liability), Errors & Omissions (E&O), and
Directors and Officers (D&O).129 The focus of this Note is solely on CGL
because these policies frequently use ISO standardized language. To date,
there has only been a handful of decisions involving insurance coverage
for opioid related claims, as the federal trials in the landmark opioid MDL
have been delayed.130
Most of the opioid suits filed thus far have alleged negligence, false
advertising, gross negligence, and unfair and deceptive practices, among
others.131 In light of the lawsuits, many of the major pharmaceutical
defendants, distributors, and retailers have attempted to report the claims
made against them and obtain coverage through their CGL policies.132
Unsurprisingly, many casualty Insurers have refused to defend these
defendants or contribute to their settlements, which has resulted in
significant insurance coverage litigation.133
To date, suits have only been litigated in state court,134 but suits filed
in both state and federal courts focus on two primary insurance coverage
issues. First, whether the public nuisance claims are “because” of “bodily
of cases settle. You can’t completely separate the settlement analysis from the
coverage”).
127. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach et al., Johnson & Johnson, Three Other Companies
Close in $26 Billion Deal on Opioid Litigation, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/opioid-settlement-drug-distributors/2020/11/
05/6a8da214-1fc7-11eb-b532-05c751cd5dc2_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q9NP-KQ
6Y] (describing the tentative $26 billion settlement that four of the largest manufacturers
or distributors of opioids agreed to in the wake of the voluminous opioid lawsuits).
128. Elfin, supra note 114.
129. See Jenna A. Hudson, The Opioid Crisis Costs Billions. Will Insurance Pay for
It? (Part 1), NAT’L L. REV. (May 21, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/opioid-crisis-costs-billions-will-insurance-pay-it-part-1./ [https://perma.cc/2XH3
-NBRQ].
130. See Meryl Kornfield, Coronavirus Stalls Long-Awaited Day in Court for
Historic Opioid Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/health/2020/12/26/coronavirus-opioid-trials/
[https://perma.cc/9VAP-MGTK]
(noting that trials have been delayed to later in 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic).
131. See Opioid Litigation: Insurance and Risk Management Considerations, supra
note 121.
132. Id.
133. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
134. Id.
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injury.”135 Second, whether the claims and injuries sustained constitute an
“occurrence” resulting in bodily injury, as defined under the policy.136
Moreover, other coverage issues presented by the opioid litigation
include:


whether the Insurer has a duty to defend;



does the products-completed operations hazard (“PCOH”) exclusion
preclude coverage;



is the complainant seeking economic damages rather than damages for
“bodily injury” as covered by the policy; and



whether the allegations involve a known loss.137

There have been mixed outcomes in decisions held to date
addressing the applicability of insurance coverage for the opioid suits.138
These conflicting results by the courts when reviewing standard policy
provisions and applying them to a set of similar facts and circumstances139
negate the perceived benefit of the standardized insurance policy
language. The CGL forms are predominately based on ISO language, and
the standardized language is intended to reduce transaction costs and
increase predictability for policyholders. However, predictability for
CGL policyholders who are entangled in the opioid litigation is virtually
non-existent, and presents a similar situation akin to the asbestos litigation
throughout the 1990s.140 The Sections that follow delve into the state court
decisions on the two primary coverage issues in the opioid suits.

See Hudson, supra note 129.
Id.
See Lorelie S. Masters et al., Insurance Coverage for Claims Stemming From the
National Opioid Crisis, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.
huntoninsurancerecoveryblog.com/2020/02/articles/d-and-o/insurance-coverage-forclaims-stemming-from-the-national-opioid-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/6X42-N3YX].
138. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
139. Id.
140. See French, supra note 14, at 569 n.196 (describing the asbestos litigation in the
1990s and the debate over “sudden and accidental” language in the CGL policy). See
also, Michelle Llamas, Opioid Lawsuits, DRUGWATCH, https://www.drugwatch.com/
opioids/lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/W655-Y6K8] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
135.
136.
137.
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B. COVERAGE ISSUE #1: PUBLIC NUISANCE “BECAUSE” OF
“BODILY INJURY”
At least 42 states have sued opioid manufacturers, attempting to hold
them liable under state nuisance law.141 Oklahoma specifically, is the first
state to go to trial.142 In an attempt to encourage settlements, these states
allege that manufacturers exaggerated the effectiveness of opioid
products in treating pain management while understating their addictive
qualities.143 These allegedly intentional and deceptive marketing practices
interfered with the “public right against unwarranted illness and
addiction.”144 The difficulty with these public nuisance allegations is that
they are not seeking compensation for bodily injuries of individuals.145
Instead, they are pursuing economic damages or funding for future
governmental services to abate the public health crisis that opioids
created.146 CGL policies, however, are designed to only defend the
policyholder against suits seeking damages for or because of the specific
bodily injury that is covered by the policy.147 Moreover, these policies are
not intended to cover foreseeable generalized public harm that is to be
expected,148 and many have argued that it was foreseeable that an
epidemic could ensue, given the addictive nature of opioids.149
141. See Jeff Feeley, Opioid Litigation Tests Public Nuisance Claim Theory, INS. J.
(May 27, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/05/27/527539.
htm [https://perma.cc/Q3VQ-BUF8].
142. Id.
143. Jennifer Skinner, Trending in Tort Law: Transforming Product Liability Claims
into Public Nuisance Actions, NAT’L. L. REV. (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.
com/article/trending-tort-law-transforming-product-liability-claims-public-nuisanceactions [https://perma.cc/3ZLB-PGEC].
144. Id.
145. See Adam Fleischer, Courts Shouldn’t Consider Bodily Injury Claims in Opioid
Suits, LAW360 (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1323537/courtsshouldn-t-consider-bodily-injury-claims-in-opioid-suits [https://perma.cc/C9JP-CB2K].
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Patrick Bedell & Allyson Spacht, Liability Insurance Outlook for Opioid Public
Nuisance Claims, LAW360 (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1265219/
liability-insurance-outlook-for-opioid-public-nuisance-claims [https://perma.cc/X4HEZVHV].
149. Associated Press & Corky Siemaszko, First it Sold Oxycontin, then Pharma
Company Saw Market for Anti-Addiction Drug, Suit Says, NBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2019, 8:01
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/unredacted-lawsuit-against-oxycontinmaker-reveals-they-pushed-opioid-low-n965721
[https://perma.cc/YSA6-VDDM];
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This section will examine five state lawsuits: Giant Eagle, Inc. v.
Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., Acuity v. Masters Pharm., Inc.,
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Richie Enterprises LLC, Steadfast Ins. Co. v.
Purdue Frederick Co., and Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid Corp. In these
lawsuits, Insurers have taken the position that the CGL policy is not
intended to cover a public nuisance claim made by a local government
because the government itself did not suffer bodily injury, just economic
damages.150 There is however, an argument that such economic damages
can be covered by the standard ISO coverage grant: “we[] will pay those
sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage.’151 In this regard, the
courts in Giant Eagle and Acuity Masters rejected the Insurers’ argument
because the coverage grant included in CGL policies extends to damages
because of bodily injury.152 It is not solely limited to damages for bodily
injuries as the court in Giant Eagle explained:
The plaintiffs in the County lawsuits seek to recover damages for
losses, and specifically costs related to emergency medical treatment,
detoxification and addiction treatment, and recovery services, that
they allegedly sustained treating and addressing bodily injuries such
as opioid abuse, addiction, overdose, and death suffered by the County
plaintiffs’ citizens, and allege that these injuries resulted from Giant

Berry Meier, Origins of an Epidemic: Purdue Pharma Knew Its Opioids Were Widely
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/health/
purdue-opioids-oxycontin.html [https://perma.cc/R2LE-7CYU]. See generally, German
Lopez, The Thousands of Lawsuits Against Opioid Companies, Explained, VOX (Oct. 17,
2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/7/15724054/opioid-epidemiclawsuits-purdue-oxycontin [https://perma.cc/D6Y7-74XP].
150. See generally Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., No. 2:19-cv00904-RJC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208951(W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2020); Acuity v. Masters
Pharm., Inc., 2020-Ohio-3440, LEXIS 2381 (Ohio App. Ct. June 24, 2020); Cincinnati
Ins. Co. v. Richie Enter., LLC, No. 1:12-CV-00186-JHM-HBB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96510 (W.D. Ky. July 16, 2014); Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Purdue Frederick Co., No.
X08CV020191697S, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1970 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 18, 2006);
Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 339, 2020, 2022 Del. LEXIS 9 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 10,
2022).
151. See, Coverage for an American Epidemic: Insurance Coverage Issues Stemming
from Opioid Litigation, CONNECTICUT BAR ASS’N (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.ctbar.
org/docs/default-source/education/clc/2020-materials/monday-september-14-morningsessions/ht01-coverage-for-an-american-epidemic-insurance-coverage-issues-stemming
-from-opioid-litigation.pdf?sfvrsn=d251c20f_4 [https://perma.cc/PPT6-PQ 6Q].
152. Id.
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Eagle’s allegedly wrongful conduct in distributing and dispensing
prescription opioids. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs in the County
lawsuits do not allege that they suffered bodily injury or property
damage, they do seek damages because of bodily injury.153

Therefore, Giant Eagle was successful in obtaining a victory over their
Insurer who, according to the court, had a duty to defend.154
The First District Court of Appeals in Acuity v. Masters Pharm., Inc.,
echoed the sentiment that an Insurer has a duty to defend a policyholder
for claims brought by governmental entities seeking economic damages,
arguably because of bodily injury.155 Ultimately the court reversed the
trial court’s judgement and held that there is a causal connection between
bodily injury suffered by individuals who become addicted to opioids and
the subsequent economic damages incurred on state governments to
combat the crisis and provide assistance to their impacted residents.156
The case was subsequently remanded to the Supreme Court of Ohio,
which agreed with the lower court and held that Acuity had a duty to
defend Masters Pharmaceuticals because of the causal connection in the
Counties’ claims, triggering the insurance policy’s coverage grant.157
However, courts in other jurisdictions have reached different
interpretations of the “because” of “bodily injury” language in the CGL
form and therefore declined to find coverage for opioid-related claims
alleging public nuisance.158 For example, in Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Richie
Enterprises LLC, West Virginia’s Attorney General sued Richie
Enterprises LLC (“Richie”), a drug manufacturer, alleging that it illegally
distributed controlled substances in excess of legitimate medical need.159
153. Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., No. 2:19-cv-00904-RJC,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208951, at *46 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2020) (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 175.
155. See Acuity v. Masters Pharm., Inc., 2020-Ohio-3440, LEXIS 2381, at *16-18
(Ohio App. Ct. June 24, 2020).
156. Id. at *1, *17-18.
157. See Courtney Horrigan & Kateri Persinger, 2 Cases Will Help Shape Opioid
Litigation Insurance Coverage, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1429602/2-cases-will-help-shape-opioid-litigation-insurance-coverage [https://
perma.cc/UW6Z-LL4R].
158. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Hunter v. Johnson & Johnson, 499 P3d 719, ¶ 43(Okla.
2021); California v. Purdue Pharma LP, No. 30-2014-00725287-CU-BT-CXC, ¶ 41 (Cal
App. Supp. Nov. 1, 2021).
159. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Richie Enter., LLC, No. 1:12-CV-00186-JHM-HBB, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96510, at *1 (W.D. Ky. July 16, 2014).
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The Attorney General further alleged that Richie created a public
nuisance by intentionally flooding the state with highly addictive
controlled substances.160 Here, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky held that the claims did not trigger Cincinnati
Insurance Company’s (“Cincinnati”) duty to defend because the suit did
not seek damages “because” of “bodily injury.”161 Instead, the state sought
economic damages to reimburse public expenditures made to combat the
impact of the opioid epidemic among residents.162 Similarly, prior to
Cincinnati v. Richie, a Connecticut court held that Steadfast Insurance had
no duty to defend Purdue in connection with suits alleging inappropriate
marketing of OxyContin because the claims did not seek damages
because of bodily injury.163
Most recently, on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court in Ace
American Insurance Company held that Ace American Insurance
Company (“Ace”), as the Insurer, did not have a duty to defend Rite Aid
in claims made against it by two Ohio counties seeking to recover opioidepidemic related damages.164 The Superior Court had previously held that
Ace did have a duty to defend.165 The insurance policy at issue in the
appeal involved a CGL ISO policy.166 However, and the policy had a
slightly different coverage grant that required the Insurer to provide
coverage for damages because of “personal injury” or “property damage,”
with personal injury being defined to include bodily injury.167 Based on
this grant, Ace argued that damages require a showing of personal injury
suffered by an individual, a standard that the counties would be unable to
reach.168 Here, the Supreme Court of Delaware agreed with Ace that the
claim by the counties only sought to recover their own economic
damages, and that the policy is triggered only for damages for “bodily
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *5, *8 (West Virginia amended its complaint to seek “medical monitoring”
expenses as opposed to damages “because” of “bodily injury” and therefore the Insurer
had no duty to defend).
163. Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Purdue Frederick Co., No. X08CV020191697S, 2006 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 1970, at *10, *20 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 18, 2006).
164. Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 339, 2020, 2022 Del. LEXIS 9, at *2324 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 2022).
165. Id. at *2.
166. Id. at *3-4.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *7.
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injury” when asserted by the person injured, persons recovering on behalf
of the person injured, or people or organizations that treated the person
injured.169 Moreover, the complaints brought against Rite Aid by the
counties did not include personal injury claims on behalf of individuals
who suffered or died because of Rite Aid’s opioid dispensing practices.170
This outcome is interesting, considering the similarities in the claim made
by the five Ohio counties against Master Pharmaceutical referenced
above. The inconsistency in the court decisions despite the similarities in
the claim and policy language, supports reevaluating the rhetoric around
insurance contracts as being standardized.
This circuit split surrounding public nuisance allegations by the
states against pharmaceutical defendants is noteworthy, especially since,
in all five cases, the states were seeking some form of economic damages
to assist with substance abuse and medical treatment costs incurred
because of the bodily injuries suffered by individual opioid users.171
While all of the cases involved an Insurer’s ISO CGL policy form that
was intended to be standardized, there were slight variations in the
coverage grant for when the policy would respond. Moreover, in those
cases that included the same standardized coverage grant for damages
because of the “bodily injury” clause, the courts were inconsistent in
finding whether the Insurer had a duty to defend.

Id. at *12.
Id. at *10.
See Jodi Green et al., Ohio Ruling Adds to Insurance Uncertainty for Opioid
Suits, LAW360 (July 8, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1289244/ohio-rulingadds-to-insurance-uncertainty-for-opioid-suits [https://perma.cc/KZ4T-UH7S] (noting
that the opioid epidemic has cost the United States upwards of $214 billion for public
services). See generally Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L. INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (May 27,
2020), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https://
perma.cc/4K76-DRU6]; Economic Impact of Non-Medical Opioid Use in the United
States, SOC’Y ACTUARIES (Oct. 2019), https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/
files/resources/research-report/2019/econ-impact-non-medical-opioid-use.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VEK3-MDJ6] (describing the alarming national health care costs for
treating and addressing opioid addiction in the United States).
169.
170.
171.
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C. COVERAGE ISSUE #2: ISO OCCURRENCE DEFINITION AND THE DUTY
TO DEFEND
Generally, “occurrence” is a standard ISO definition within CGL
policies and is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions” that was
neither expected nor intended by the policyholder.172 This Section reviews
three cases where the ISO definition of occurrence was used in the CGL
policy and discusses how the courts interpreted the provisions to
determine whether the insured had a duty to defend. In Cincinnati Ins. Co.
v. H.D. Smith, LLC, the Seventh Circuit evaluated West Virginia’s
complaint against H.D. Smith (“H.D.”), a pharmaceutical distributor. The
state alleged that H.D. knowingly provided citizens with controlled
substances even though H.D. knew that the citizens were not using them
for legitimate medical purposes.173 Cincinnati argued that there was no
“occurrence” because there was not an “accident” that would trigger this
provision under its policy and, therefore, Cincinnati had no duty to
defend.174 However, the court held that the Insurer was required to defend
and pay defense costs for H.D. because the complaint alleged negligent
misconduct, which was considered to be an “occurrence.”175 Ultimately,
Cincinnati’s CGL policy provided coverage for the $3.5 million
settlement between H.D. Smith and the state of West Virginia.176
Similarly, in Liberty Mutual v. JM Smith Corp, the Fourth Circuit
evaluated whether the West Virginia Attorney General’s allegation that
JM Smith, a pharmaceutical distributor, had “substantially contribut[ed]
to” the epidemic by failing to maintain sufficient controls that would flag
suspicious orders of prescription drugs, even though they were on notice
172. See Cathleen Cinella Tylis & Dennis J. Artese, Securing Insurance Coverage for
Construction Defect Claims, Anderson Kill & Ollick, P.C. Summer 2004 Reconstruction,
3 ANDERSON KILL & OLRICK 1, 2 (2004); R. Steven Rawls, CGL Insurance and the
Question of Intent, IRMI (Feb. 2009), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary
/cgl-insurance-and-the-question-ofintent?msclkid=406e3232c17611ecb971278bf4ce46
73 [https://perma.cc/YF8Q-GWGK] (last visited May 18, 2022).
173. 829 F. 3d. 771 (7th Cir. 2016).
174. Id.
175. Id. See also Hudson, supra note 129.
176. Bernard Bell et al., United States: $3.5 Million Opioid Insurance Settlement Is
Covered by CGL Insurance, Says Federal Court, MILLER FRIEL (Nov. 5, 2019), https://
www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/insurance-laws-and-products/860718/35-millionopioid-insurance-settlement-is-covered-by-cgl-insurance-says-federal-court
[https://perma.cc/G26D-B3BA].
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about the opioid epidemic.177 The coverage dispute here between the
Insurer and insured was whether this alleged failure constituted an
“occurrence” under the distributor’s CGL policy with Liberty Mutual.178
Here, Liberty Mutual contended that it had no duty to defend because the
complaint did not allege an “occurrence” within the definition of its
policy, since the complaint alleged intentional misconduct, which would
not be considered an accident under the policy.179 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling that Liberty had a duty to defend JM
Smith in the lawsuit because the claim created a possibility of coverage
under the CGL policy as an accident, since JM Smith was negligent by
breaching its duty of care in marketing, promoting, and distributing
controlled substances.180
However, in Traveler’s Property Casualty Co. of Am. v. Actavis,
Inc., a California appellate court ruled that the insurance company,
Travelers, did not have a duty to defend.181 Here, Santa Clara and Orange
counties brought a lawsuit against various pharmaceutical manufacturers
and distributors, including Actavis.182 The counties alleged that the
pharma entities engaged in deceptive marketing campaigns promoting
controlled substances, which led to an increase in sales for opioids, thus
fueling the opioid epidemic.183 Actavis sought to obtain coverage under
its CGL policy from Travelers, who denied having a duty to defend.184
Similar to the cases referenced above, Travelers argued that the complaint
did not allege an accident and therefore did not constitute an “occurrence”
under its policy, since the policyholders were acting intentionally by

177.
178.
179.

602 F. App’x. 115, 117 (4th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 117-19.
Id. at 117 (noting that occurrence under Liberty’s CGL policy used the standard
ISO language as follows occurrence means an “accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful conditions”).
180. Id. at 121 (noting that “though the defendants here may have known generally
that prescription drug abuse was a problem in West Virginia, the complaint does not
allege knowledge of harm directly attributable to any one distributor such that further
violations must necessarily be done with intent to harm. Surely the attenuated chain of
causation here creates at least a possibility of coverage in this case.” The court also
focused on how South Carolina law should be applied to this diversity suit, which
imposes a broad duty to defend on Insurers).
181. 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 5, 1033 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
182. Id. at 1030, 1033-34.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1030.
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engaging in deceptive marketing campaigns.185 Travelers used the ISO
standard occurrence definition within its policy form.186 The court agreed,
and held that there was no accident because the claims were based on
misrepresentations, which are considered intentional for the purposes of
insurance under California law.187 Thus, because the conduct was
intentional and not negligent, the court found no accident and, therefore,
no “occurrence” that would trigger a defense obligation from Travelers. 188
Despite the uniformity in the “occurrence” definition contained in
CGL policies, state courts have come out differently in the handful of
cases that have been litigated to date. It is perplexing, and even
unexpected, how the court came out in Travelers for the alleged
misconduct, given the similarities to the allegations the respective
plaintiffs pled in Cincinnati and Liberty Mutual, and the fact that all
policies used the ISO definition of “occurrence.”189 An alternative
explanation is that the different outcomes could perhaps be a factor of the
governing state law for insurance coverage, specifics on the underlying
complaint, or even the method of interpretation and canon used by the
court.
D. INSURANCE MARKETS RESPONSE
Case law to date is somewhat encouraging for policyholders, but
Insurers will continue to aggressively challenge coverage for opioidrelated claims. In response to the volume of lawsuits and astronomical
defense and settlement figures, Insurers have taken several actions, such
as containing limit losses to specific policy periods and imposing prior
knowledge exclusions where possible.190 Additionally, Insurers have
removed coverage for opioid products via exclusions on a go-forward
basis.191 In theory, this seems like an appropriate response by insurance
companies to protect themselves, but future litigation will be complicated
because of the lack of standard exclusionary language used.192 There is
Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1030.
See supra Section III.C.
See Coverage for An American Epidemic: Insurance Coverage Issues Stemming
from Opioid Litigation, supra note 151.
191. Id.
192. Id.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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not a uniform opioid exclusion in the marketplace, as each market has
generally drafted its own exclusion or relied on others in part.193 As such,
some use “opioids,” whereas others refer to “narcotics,” or take a much
broader exclusionary approach and reference the entire Controlled
Substance’s Act.194 Furthermore, many insurance companies are
excluding opioid products in their entirety, while others are tailoring the
exclusion to the kinds of actions being brought or the entities bringing the
suits.195 Others have taken a more favorable approach for policholders, by
implementing a broad opioid and/or epidemic exclusions, but offer
coverage carvebacks for specific kinds of activity like manufacturing
defects or opioids used in clinical trials.196 These exclusions may be added
to all policies irrespective of actual exposure.197
The variations in opioid exclusions may be especially challenging
for pharmaceutical defendants who purchase large towers of insurance,198
with several different Insurers providing limits.199 They could easily find
themselves in a predicament where their insurance program will not be
uniform as to whether Insurers have a duty to defend for opioid related
matters, even though their policies are all standard ISO CGL forms.
Additionally, not only are Insurers amending their policies by adding
exclusions that provide deficient coverage, but they are also increasing
the premium charged for insureds with pharmaceutical exposure,
especially those with opioid or controlled substances.200 Thus,
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Opioid Crisis: Insurers on the Defense, SWISS RE, https://www.swissre.com/
dam/jcr:e115d42b-dd51-4339-9c74-e2a60cf468ef/ARM-18-01329-P1-Trend_Spotlight
-Opioids-6-27USletter-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ2E-HXBU] (last visited Apr. 14,
2022).
198. A tower of insurance is the total amount of insurance limits that a policyholder
purchases for any particular coverage line of insurance. See generally Dr. Patrick Conroy
and Dr. Jordan Miller, Insurance Coverage Terms and Predicted Settlements, NERA
(Febr. 12, 2012), https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB_
Insurance_Coverage_Towers_0212.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKG8-T45Y].
199. See generally Scott M. Seaman and Charlene Kittredge, Excess Liability
Insurance: Law and Litigation, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 653, 653-55 (1997) (describing
excess liability insurance purchased for catastrophic protection and are built in layers
above a primary policy, such as a CGL policy).
200. See generally Mark Waterkeyn, Global Insurance Market Heavily Exposed to
US Opioid Crisis, LOCKTON (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.locktoninternational.com/
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policyholders are paying more and, in most cases, have little to no
coverage on a go-forward basis for their opioid related products.
PART IV. CONCLUSION
Insurance policies have been overgeneralized as standardized
contracts, especially for commercial policyholders, for two main reasons.
First, while insurance is regulated in the admitted market in an effort to
reduce transaction and search costs on the part of the policyholder, there
are inconsistencies in ISO standardized wording both in personal and
commercial lines.201 Additionally, there is an entire subset of the
insurance marketplace for specialty lines coverages on a non-admitted
basis, where policies are not drafted with standardized language.202
Therefore, vast variances in policy language exist among Insurers.203
Second, boilerplate language is intended to ensure consistent application
and interpretation by courts, but this is not being achieved with insurance
policies, and, more specifically CGL policies.204
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the current opioid litigation
and resulting coverage disputes. The few court decisions to date have not
been consistent—some have favored the insured, whereas others have
favored the Insurer.205 The lack of uniformity in case outcomes is
depleting the perceived value behind insurance as standardized contracts.
Moreover, the outlook is just as grim regarding inconsistent opioid
exclusions that Insurers are imposing on a go-forward basis, as we can
expect case law to continue to be irreconcilable where varying exclusions
are used. For these reasons, we should alter our conception of insurance
as a standardized contract.
Perhaps one solution is for ISO to craft a standard opioid exclusion
to be used by any admitted Insurer offering CGL coverage. However, it
will be challenging to convince Insurers to adopt such wording, as many
have been impacted differently by the opioid litigation. Due to the lack of
uniformity, some have had to pay significant defense and settlements

gb/articles/global-insurance-market-heavily-exposed-us-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/
DLZ3-FD7D].
201. See supra Part I.
202. See supra Section II.C.
203. See supra Section II.C.
204. See supra Part III.
205. See supra Sections III.B., III.C.
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costs for insureds, whereas others have no losses on their book to date,
but perhaps are entangled in the MDL or are involved with D&O suits. 206
Therefore, Insurers will be less likely to cede their ability to revise and
amend their policy language. Instead, many Insurers prefer the flexibility
they currently have in being able to amend language as they see fit, which
may be increasingly valuable as the opioid litigation evolves and
progresses in the long-run.
Finally, while the opioid coverage disputes litigated to date have
predominately entailed ISO standardized CGL policies, many
pharmaceutical policyholders choose to procure coverage from the nonadmitted marketplace, where policy forms are not based on standardized
language.207 Given the number of defendants in the MDL, it is plausible
that not all obtain product liability coverage through a CGL policy form,
but rather a specialized policy form like the life sciences product liability
form.208 Therefore, we can expect courts to diverge even more in their
decisions on whether insurance coverage applies in disputes involving
non-admitted policy forms. Overall, there will be a continued ripple effect
of uncertainty as case law continues to diverge on whether coverage
applies for both admitted and non-admitted policies involved in the opioid
epidemic litigation.
The opioid epidemic is incredibly complex and the litigation is far
from over. Insurance companies have accepted this view and responded
by attaching inconsistent opioid exclusions to their policies, thus moving
further away from the notion that insurance policies are standardized
contracts. These variances will continue to propel mixed decisions by the
courts. The outlook for the insurance industry and policyholders involved
is unclear with no readily apparent solution. However, policyholders of
all degrees of sophistication should heed the warnings from the court
decisions to date, and carefully review their policies. The opioid epidemic
highlights how CGL policies are labeled as standardized contracts, but
this is really a misnomer. There is no such thing as predictability when it

206. See generally Liability Limit Benchmarks & Large Loss Profile by Industry
Sector, CHUBB BERMUDA, https://www.chubb.com/content/dam/chubb-sites/chubb-com/
au-en/business/large-multinational-businesses-insurance/documents/pdf/chubbbermuda-2020-large-loss-limit-benchmark-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCH6-AUN5]
(last visited May 18, 2022).
207. See supra Section II.C.
208. See supra Section III.C.
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comes to insurance policies and the rhetoric around insurance policies as
standardized contracts needs to change.

